2
companies consisting of Infantry, Elands and Mortars going north on the main
road.THE
BATTLE FOR EBO (1975)
To
get things in perspective I think I will have to go back to 11 November 1975, as
soon as we got word that the Portuguese had not recognised the MPLA as the sole
representative of the Angolan people, it still was anybody's war.2
companies consisting of Infantry, Elands and Mortars going north on the main
road.
Capt.
Holm had made better time on the tarred highway, but he also had some problems,
one of our Elands got to with 50 metres of the cheese factory when we discovered
that the Cubans and Fapla were dug in on two koppies called Taba and Canda, east
of the road and on the other side of the factory, the road was so narrow that
the Eland couldn't make a U-turn once it drew fire and had to reverse all the
way back. This battle lasted 9 hours, and the terrain off r
oad
was that bad that the infantry had no choice but to stay on the road, which
surprise surprise was a registered target, the armour and even the mortar
platoons weren't able to get closer than 8 klicks, during the course of the
battle Lt Duraan rocked up but being stuck on the dirt roads he couldn't get
closer than 4 klicks to Capt. Holm and thus couldn't give effective fire
support. Another disadvantage that he had was that there wasn't any cover
available for his armoured cars, when they deployed they received incoming fire
from 14.7 mm AAA, these shot away their bins and most of the junk they had tied
to their turrets. His gunner was a first member of Foxbat that got revved by Red
Eyes, courtesy of Fapla. By nightfall both combat groups went back to Cela where
everybody realised that it was suicide to try and take on the Cubans and Fapla
without Arty. Luckily for them the gunners were on their way.
On
the morning of 12 November Capt. Holm ordered Lt Du Toit to take his troop north
again, Capt. Holm had a habit of acquiring Honda 4 x 4's and by this time he had
got himself another, but this time it was a blue one. He and this blue Honda
joined up with Lt Du Toit, and hit the road They were rather surprised when they
were able to drive right up to Fapla's position of the day before and found it
deserted, the Grad P and anti aircraft machine gun looking rather forlorn,
saying "Take us with you". We found, quite often, that during Savannah
it was a sort of 9 to 5 war the other guys adhered to. Fortunately for us Fapla
made a balls up this day by sleeping late which would cost them dear...
After
checking for booby-traps, the weapons, ammo and whatever could be used was
loaded onto our vehicles and the journey north was resum
ed
until we reached a saddle in the Cassamba mountains, from there the road
meanders down a valley to the Nhia river. As we reached the saddle, a Fapla
convoy consisting of 2 Landrover and 2 Gaz vehicles were spotted moving towards
us, the Elands were deployed in the bushes by the side of the road and Fapla
drove into the ambush blissfully unaware of what was in store; the front and
back vehicles were shot out by the Elands and the infantry finished off the two
in the middle with small arms. Somewhere in Angola there are 2 world class
sprinters and I for one wish them well even they might be somewhat buggered and
bent like me nowadays, may they grow old and never have low back pain. The rear
vehicle actually became airborne when the 90mm Heat projectile struck it, apart
from small arms and ammo a 75 mm recoilless rifle was also captured, a while
later the combat team encountered the temporary base where the convoy had set
off from, but by then the straphangers who were manning this had gapped it as
soon as they saw us, no doubt alerted by the goings on earlier, the only
noteworthy find apart from the odd AK were some pots full of Mealiepap which we
had for a belated breakfast with "Wambo's".
Major
Holtzhausen joined us at this point and the combat team moved as fast as it was
prudent North only encountering very ight resistance and reached the bridge
spanning the N
hia
- Bridge 14, by about 13H00,only to have it blown up in our faces. A very
professional job this was indeed, both bridgeheads had been utterly destroyed,
and although the river was not very wide, our Elands were unable to ford this
due to the depth of the water, and allied to the fact that the Nhia was in flood
this effectively put paid to this operation. We were only able to cross this
obstacle a month later after a 5 day offensive, the positive result however was
the neutralising of Fapla and their Cuban allies from the area around Cela and
we could move up our HQ further North. The demolition of the bridge over the
Nhia was the first of many undertaken by the Cuban advisors to hinder Foxbat and
Zulu from gaining territory and for the first time we started to encounter the
extensive use of minefields to slow us down. On 15 November we suffered our
first casualty from a mine when a Unita soldier lost a foot on the banks of the
Nhia, the first of many...
After
considering his options Cmdt Webb decided to send a party to reconnoiter Conde
via Ebo and Hengo on 13 November and later that same day this combat team bumped
into Fapla in the vicinity of Ebo, after a short fire fight Fapla gapped it. The
fact that Fapla already had forces in numbers at Ebo, made Cmdt Webb decide to
by-pass Ebo and carry on towards Catofè and Quibala, using the routes available
on his eastern flank. By this time there were large concentrations of Fapla in
front of the 
Nhia,
and he had to keep them in the dark as to what his intentions were, Lt Van
Niekerk was tasked to recce the two routes to Ebo. Initially
the combat team tried the route via Hengo, but again they were delayed once
more, by a destroyed wooden bridge. Using the tow cables of the Elands, and some
wooden poles nearby they managed to build a surface the Elands could traverse
albeit with some care, once across they had no surprises and reached Ebo later
on. The town was a ghost town and many of those who were there that day later on
mentioned that the place gave them the Heebie Jeebies to say the least. Signs of
human occupation there was a-plenty, fresh tyre tracks, stoves with the
omnipresent pots of Mealiepap still cooking on them, there were open boxes of
ammo on the streets, but the population seem to have disappeared into thin air. Lt
Van Nierkerk was deeply suspicious of this Marie Celeste situation and posted
two armoured cars at the two entrances to the town. He decided to reconnoiter on
his own towards Quibala, but after 2 klicks he decided that this was rather
foolish, and turned back, this was a very wise decision....
Most
combat teams during Savannah were ad-hoc units based on the concept that even
though you might be a cook, signaler or whatever attached 
to
an Infantry Unit, as a result of this attachment you were an Infantryman first
and foremost, and whatever secondly, allied to the fact that during this era
nobody micro managed us, gave us a degree of autonomy and flexibility that was
probably unique in the history of the SADF, the down side was that sometimes the
supply chain broke down, but most of the units managed to make do , we never ran
out of fuel and ammunition, food quite often, and our weaponry was outdated to
say the least. Vehicles were obtained by means fair and foul, and most of those
who took part in Savannah can probably remember the civilian trucks we pressed
into service, the best I ever saw was a civilian truck locked and put up for
storage, the fuel tank was padlocked, but about 10 minutes of undivided
attention and a jerry can full of diesel transformed this into a welcome
addition to our group, no windows were broken, the lock on the fuel tank was
picked, and the truck was hot-wired, makes you wonder though what some fellows
did in civilian life! The only problem was the colours these Civvie trucks came
in, in the case of Lt van Niekerk the one carrying the mortar platoon was a
bright Day-Glo orange.
The
two things we did in Angola whenever we had a chance was to eat or sleep, this
modus operandi was based on the premise that you never knew when you would have
the chance to do one or the other again. Everybody had just started eating in
Ebo when Fapla decided join in uninvited and signaled their displeasure for not
having received an invitation to dine by revving all and sundry with RPG 7's and
Grad P's. Things became somewhat hectic to say the least, and Lt Van Niekerk
decided that 
discretion
was the better part of valour, but two of his Eland armoured cars refused to
start, most probably the engines had been flooded by the drivers, all the towing
cables had been used to construct the bridge earlier on, and as a desperate
measure somebody hit on the idea to join the jumper cables of the armoured cars
and use these as tow ropes. To cap it all it started to rain, and using the rain
as a screen Fapla started to advance, by this time the route we had used coming
into Ebo had been cut by the enemy and the only avenue of escape was a road to
the right, nobody knew where this led to. The orange truck was a major
disadvantage as this was highly visible and everybody was relieved when we were
out of range, and noses were counted, it was confirmed that nobody had been left
behind in the rush. Throughout this whole episode the two armoured cars were
still being towed, the makeshift towrope kept on snapping, and had to be
repaired, on one occasion at least these repairs took place under fire.
Eventually
the combat group discovered a fairly good road, which incidentally was marked
only as a track on the Caltex road maps we used to navigate in Angola in those 
days.
This road led to a river, the Tunga, and it came as no surprise when they found
that this bridge was down. Comms were established with Capt. Holm and he was
informed of their plight. They realised that with Fapla following up and no
bridging equipment there was a problem, sort of...
Again
the Afrikaans saying "'n Boer maak 'n plan" came to its own: each
Eland has metal plates bolted on the glacis plate, these are intended to be used
as a duckboard on soft terrain to prevent the vehicle from sinking into the
ground, what the crews did was to bolt all of these plates together and thus
create a makeshift bridge, most of those present including Lt Van Niekerk knew
that this was a do or die effort, an Eland weighs about 5.4 tons these plates
were now being asked to do the impossible. As the first Eland crossed towing the
other, the whole contraption buckled and twisted, for a moment it looked as if
both of them would end up in the river bed, but it held, and they were across,
the third and fourth Eland car followed suit, the runners deployed to give
covering fire, and as the last vehicle made it across the first 122 mm rockets
started landing amongst them. Like something out of a B western, the cavalry in
the shape of Capt. Holm and his combat group arrived, after a short firefight
Fapla decided to retire and left Lt Van Niekerk master of the battlefield, but
also very relieved about the fact that he had completed his mission that day
although at times it was sort of touch and go. The SADF "took" Ebo on
Saturday 15/11/75.
After
routing Fapla both teams went back to the first river where the tow cables that
had been used to build a bridge were recovered, and went "home" 
to
Santa Comba, some serious soul-searching took place as a result of the 4 day
excursion and the subsequent encounters with Fapla and their Cuban allies. It
became clear to us that we had no answer to the Grad P without Arty. In the
meantime Cmdt Webb had been replaced by Cmdt George Kruys and a second squadron
Elands arrived, as well as battery consisting of four 8.8cm (WWII vintage 25
pounders) guns arrived under the command of Maj. Chris Venter, the next couple
of days were spent welding the Armour, Artillery and Infantry into combat teams
who could and would give as good and better than they got.
A
few days later the march on Quibala got underway.
Foxbat
was still looking for a route and at first light 18/11/75 Capt. Holm and Maj.
Holtzhausen both departed with a combat team from Santa Comba. From the start
Maj. Holtzhausen found it heavy going on his route in the mountainous
countryside of the Nhia river valley, due to the poor conditions of the roads.
Early in the afternoon he decided to return to base, but with the marshy
terrain, none existent roads and rotten wooden bridges it was four in the
morning on the 19th when he finally returned to base. This was the route that
Cmdt initially chose as his line of march to attack Quibala, but as a result of
the poor results from this recce, it was back to the drawing board...
We
had a choice of two routes we could follow, the first option was the route via
Ebo to Condè where we had just destroyed the bridge over the Tunga. The other
option was the route via Hengo
,
but the enemy had blown the bridge here, this option was the least favoured as
the bridge was a registered target and under enemy observation, when the recce
party arrived there to see what the situation was,
they were revved and was fortunate to escape unharmed. The
only option was for Major Holtzhausen to rebuild the bridge they had destroyed
not so long ago, ironically enough a week later only 20 Klicks away Fapla would
be rebuilding the bridge they had blown up at Hengo. The banks of the Tunga
aren't very steep and it was relatively easy to construct a ford so that the
advance could continue, the first troops crossed but then the weather took a
hand, it started to rain, hours on end. Anybody who has experienced the rain in
Angola will know what this means, virtually solid sheets of water coming down,
visibility cut down to about 1.5 metres, the phrase " Its tipping down
" must have originated here, a solid wall of water washed away the ford and
the ballast leaving a sea of mud, vehicles were swamped, comms were
non-existent, at that time we were using the A36 set, well, you couldn't even
contact someone 500 metres away, messages had to be relayed by foot, that
evening we laagered at Quissobi that boasted a Cuca Shop, a house and a clinic
built by the Portuguese in the Colonial times.
The
same day Capt. Holm had taken the Western route, apart from trying to find a way
to Quibala he had to destroy the bridge that had been discovered over the Tunga
near Ebo earlier, as Fapla and the Cubans would be able to attack us in the rear
if they could repeat Lt Van Niekerk's' trick , to get to his objective he had
the choice of two roads , these joined one another at a junction which with
surprising originality everyone called the "Y ", once he had reached
the junction he decided to go to Ebo via Quissobi. It really was uneventful
until they got to the Tunga when after rounding a bend about 1 Klick from the
river they suddenly found themselves face to face with an enemy convoy
consisting of three trucks moving towards them . Luckily cool heads prevailed
and immediately the Elands went over to the attack, and blocked the enemies
escape route by knocking out the rear truck of the convoy, the infantry
dismounted and finished the job with small arms and in the process became the
proud owners of two brand new trucks , slightly second hand, used , one previous
owner, Sans windscreen in one case.
The
capture of these two trucks really turned out to be a goldmine, in one of them
half the load consisted of proper military maps of Angola, stacked abo
ut
a metre high, these turned out to be a Godsend to the South African forces
during Savannah , the Caltex and Shell road maps we had to rely up to now could
be relegated. The rest of the convoys cargo consisted of boots, which the Unita
contingent really appreciated as about 75% of them were without footwear,
uniforms which some of us would regret later on not getting our hands on ,
Havana cigars, cigarettes, brand name Populares (sp.?) canned food from China
and the Netherlands. Whilst everybody was looking at all these goodies and
having fun and games, the truck that had been shot out was still burning and
seeing it had been carrying ammunition, this provided some excitement as the
occasional round or mortar shell would cook off. After this engagement Lt Du
Raan demolished the bridge and with our two new trucks leading and Capt. Holm in
his "new" blue Honda following them, the convoy started on its way
back to base. Capt. Holm had the habit of suddenly appearing out of thin air
with this vehicle in the environs of Cela much to the chagrin of friend and foe
alike. Nobody really likes somebody suddenly scaring the hell out of you when
they materialise next to you when you are doing something you shouldn't be doing
in the first place.
Well,
Tuesday 18th November 1975, was to prove to be no exception ...
Unbeknownst
to us the enemy had followed a route we were unaware of , and had decided to
occupy the "Y" as this would enable them to cut off both routes to
Quibala via CondE8 .They were expecting reinforcements and when our two newest
acquisitions appeared these were allowed through the area covered by the
"Y" and for a while the enemy of never even realised that there was
anything untoward going on. The same couldn't be said when the blue Honda made
its appearance, those following in his wake were just in time to witness a sight
that few are privileged to see, let alone survive without a scratch, 30 or so
Fapla soldiers opening up with small arms from about 20 - 25 metres on the
Honda, Capt. Holm spat in the face of Death that day and got away with it...
When
he realised what was happening he did the only thing possible, floored the
accelerator, and drove through the ambush, the Honda had been hit in four places
, the left front wheel, a ricochet throug
h
the roof, the back of the drivers seat and one just behind his heel on the
floor. Once he had reached safety, with considerable sang-froid he parked the
car, switched off the ignition, and wandered back to watch the bun fight from a
distance. In the triangle formed by the "Y" there was a dense
eucalyptus plantation, the one leg of the "Y" points South, and Fapla
had chosen their positions to stop any advance from a southerly direction on the
"Y". The South African Combat team had unexpectedly arrived to their
rear along the other leg of the "Y" It would be difficult to say who
had the biggest fright, Fapla or us, as both parties had thought themselves
relatively secure, Fapla and the South Africans recovered from this nasty
surprise in double quick time, and before long there was fierce fire fight in
progress. The first troop of Elands engaged the enemy and advised those
following of the situation, and these started to deploy. The 2 Eland troops
deployed on the farm roads whilst the mortar crews had to deploy on the tar road
in front of their orange Civvie truck.
Luckily
for us Lt Du Raan was on high ground and he could plot the fire of the mortar
crews that enabled them to spoil FAPLA's' day somewhat. This was turning out to
be a day of surprises to say the least, without realising it the rest of the
combat group had by-passed the enemies infantry positions. While the mortars and
Elands in front were firing at the enemy, one of the South African drivers in
the rear of the convoy left his vehicle and mooched over to one of our Elands,
as he was talking to the commander in the turret he noticed a group of infantry
approaching the Eland.
At
first he thought that these were Unita soldiers, but then the penny dropped,
there were no Whites integrated in the Unita forces, this had to be Fapla, and
those Whites either had to be Russians or Cubans, by this time the enemy was
quite close to the Eland , but a quick word and some MG fire solved that
problem, a close call! Fapla decided to call it a day after losing some men, the
South African Combat Team suffered no casualties, the spoils consisted of three
75mm Recoilless rifles, ammunition for these, and the ubiquitous AK47's, again
we managed to shoot out a ammunition vehicle that kept everybody on their toes
while it was burning. Although no progress had been made in the campaign to take
Quibala, at least we had stopped the enemy from digging in at the strategic
crossroads only 12 klicks from Foxbats' base.
The
only way that seemed feasible was the route towards the West....
The
following day the Engineers started rebuilding the bridge with material they
found locally, these National Servicemen were the unsung heroes of Savannah, 18,
19 year olds that did everything and more that was asked from them, day after
day week after week. At last light on 22 November 1975, they were able to look
back and feel justifiably proud. The bridge was finished.
While
all this was going on those of the combat group who were keeping an eye over the
Engineers busied itself with the mundane tasks that soldiers all over the
centuries have occupied themselves with, writing letters, cleaning weapons,
wondering if the folks back home were alright.
A
light 'plane appeared one day and caused some anxiety as it circled over their
position a couple of times, one of the problems both sides faced in Angola as
mentioned previously, was the fact that appearances never were what they seemed
to be, and this proved to be no exception, both sides used and commandeered
civilian aircraft, and when choppers made their appearance the fact that both
sides used Allouette's had fatal consequences for the South African forces on
one occasion...
As
standard operating procedure dictated that no one was to fire until the identity
of the aircraft had been established a radio message was sent " Be advised,
we have an aircraft over our position at grid reference so and so, do you have
any knowledge of any friendly flights in the vicinity?
"Standby
" was the reply from the combat groups H Q, who in turn got in touch with
Cela.
"Negative,
I say negative." was the message that was eventually relayed to the Elands
guarding the Engineers, but by that time the 'plane was long gone. Later that
evening some of the Eland gunners were prepared to swear on a stack of Bibles
that they could have taken out the 'plane with their 90mm cannon, no problem, if
this message had been received a few minutes earlier.
Such
are the fortunes of war...
During
this period FLNA soldiers from Sa Da Bandeira and Moçamedes under the command
of Maj. Jock Harris and Sgt Almerino Mourao Da Costa reinforced us. In the
battle that followed FNLA, Unita and South Africans would fight and die side by
side for the first time in Angola. Cmdt. Kruys' Force was exposed to the enemy
for two days who could evaluate the South Africans' strength and weakness at
their leisure, so we had no chance of catching them with their pants down.
Kruys
knew that the enemy would be waiting for him this time.
The
Force that set off on Sunday 23 November 1975 to take Ebo was under the command
of Capt. Holm. This was to be his last contact, his place on the
"Flossie" taking him back to the "States" had been booked
long time ago. Maj. Holtzhausen was in charge of the tactical H.Q. at Tunga
while Capt. Anton Fourie was in charge of the reserve squadron. The Arty under
Maj. Venter was tasked with the 81mm and 107mm mortars to deliver fire support
if necessary. The night before the attack an order group was held as usual, Lt.
Van Niekerk had built a model of the area around Ebo, and Capt. Holm presented
his plan.
This
is how he saw the situation -
His
appreciation was that the enemy would try to ambush us north of Ebo therefore
our orders were to move through the town as fast as possible as fighting in
built up areas was bad news, and to keep on going until we hit the stream about
2.5 klicks north of the town itself. The Infantry would have to dismount here
and clear the forested area between the two koppies (on both sides of the road).
After this had been completed the advance would be continued.
Capt.
Holm had decided that Lt. Swanepoel's Troop would be in the vanguard with Lt. Du
Toit's Troop following him. When Capt. Holm announced this everybody broke up,
Lt. Du Toit was reputed to initiate contacts when nobody else would do so, and
had earned the nickname "Magnet Arse". Whenever fire was exchanged he
was always in the thick of it and more than once the following phrase
"Johan you can be wherever you want tomorrow, I bet your ass you'll be the
first one to make contact with the enemy" was heard under gales of
hysterical laughter.
As
the first rays of the sun lit up the sky on Sunday 23 November, a short service
was held and we asked God to be with us on this day, afterwards keys were turned
in ignitions, engines coughed, sputtered and fired, engines ran irregular at
first and later on settled into a steady purr, the signalers tested their
radios, some of us had a piss, most of us did some soul searching, some read
their Bibles and prayed, cigarettes were lit, the older ones amongst us thought
about wives and children, and I bet all of us looked at the sky and wondered if
we would see a sunrise again...
Foxbat
crossed the Tunga without incident, once across we realised that we were well
and truly in "Indian" Country, but nothing untoward happened and round
about 08H00 the leading echelon entered Ebo and it was with a sense of
foreboding that the members of the task force surveyed the deserted streets, no
food on stoves this time, somebody must have told the folks this time that the
" Boere" were on their way. We had the services of Lt Williamson,
courtesy of the SAAF spying out the land for us in his Cessna, in the days
leading up to this incursion he had reported lots of traffic on this road, but
today there was nothing. Not a soul to be seen.
Capt.
Holm decided to push on and as the first Eland moved out of Ebo, a shot was
fired from a high koppie, (Dondo) with a RPG 7, this put the wind up everybody
and our FAC asked Lt Williamson to have a shufti at this. He reported that two
trucks were gapping it from two koppies about 3 Klicks North of Ebo, we then
decided that this shot must have been a warning, and everybody got back on the
trucks and we carried on along the road. Lt Swanepoel leading with his troop of
Elands arrived first at the two koppies, he saw some tracks leading from the tar
road into the bush and decided to follow suit and find out what they had been up
to, before carrying on. He signaled his intention and his Eland followed the
tracks. It was clear that the two trucks had been bogged down and that
considerable effort had been made to get them out, the tools the enemy had been
using had been left behind, to his discomfort his Eland suffered the same fate,
and he had to be pulled from the mud, this gave rise to great hilarity as all
his friends started ribbing him for "Bogging down in the face of the
enemy". Little did they realise that most of them would suffer the same
fate that day.
Once
back on the road Lt Swanepoel carried on with the advance and realised that he
had reached the area where Capt. Holm had expected them to be ambushed. Lt
Williamson advised that he had spotted the enemy trucks parked about 2 klicks
North from the Elands on the banks of the Mabassa River, an ideal target of
opportunity. Lt Swanepoel had by this time moved about 200 metres North from the
koppies but could not see the trucks. He spotted a dirt track road about towards
the East and took his troop along this in the hope that he might be able to spot
the enemy, without luck. Lt Williamson was spitting nails with frustration at
this state of affairs, in desperation he flew over the Elands directly towards
the enemy to show their position to the Elands, who traversed their guns in that
direction and fired about 30 rounds to no effect. It was clear to the South
Africans that the enemy was not Fapla this time, in the past under such a volume
of fire, even if it was inaccurate, Fapla would react in one of two ways, either
gap it, or return fire, both courses of action would have suited us down to the
ground, but the Cubans who were facing us this time was of a totally different caliber,
their fire discipline was excellent and we were still none the wiser as to where
their positions were, and would remain so until it was to late for Foxbat to do
anything about it.
Lt
Johan Du Toit, leader of the second troop of Elands, decided that we had to
force the issue and advised that he was moving forward, Capt. Holm advised him
to be on the lookout for mines at the approaches to the bridge and the 4 Elands
started moving forward, to support Lt Du Toit, Lt Swanepoel ordered his troop to
get off the road and to advance in two groups parallel with Lt Du Toit's Elands.
The two in front had scarcely advanced 100 metres when they sank to their axles
in the mud, and for all intents and purposes were rendered Hors de Combat: Lt Du
Toit kept a running commentary of his progress up to the bridge, and then the
magic words came over the receiver " I am at the bridge" Lt Williamson
broke in to advise that he had observed some movement on the bridge itself, when
the first shots shattered the silence "Get us out of here!" we heard
Lt Du Toit scream over the radio, a cloud of black smoke suddenly appeared above
the treetops where the bridge was, and the only sound on the radio was the hiss
of static.
We
had suffered our first loss of the day, there would be many more...
Lt
Du Toit's Eland had been taken out by a 75mm recoilless rifle that had been
emplaced on the opposite river bank, as this weapon was situated on a higher
plane than the target it was actually firing downwards, and the hollow charge
projectile had no problem defeating the Elands armour that only offered
protection against small-arms in any case. Trooper Neil Lombaard from
Riebeeck-Wes died on the spot, the Eland went out of control and ended up on its
side in the river, this signaled the start of the battle, at 09H00 in the
morning. We heard numerous radio broadcasts from Luanda afterwards that we had
been taken by surprise this morning, nothing could be further from the truth, we
knew they would try and stop us before we crossed the river, and Capt. Holm had
two choices:
1..
Advance along the road which was the only surface suitable for the Elands,
2..
Keep the Elands in reserve and let the Unita and FNLA infantry try and take the
bridge.
It
really came down to one choice in the end, as there was no way that the Unita
and FNLA Infantry would go forward on their own.
After
recovering from the effects of the explosion, Lt Du Toit and his gunner observed
a Grad P position barely 50 metres to the front of them, attempts to relay this
information failed due to the fact that their antenna had been grounded and
although they could receive messages they could not transmit. At this point in
the battle neither Lt Du Toit nor Cpl van der Merwe had any inclination to
rectify this situation, this surely would have alerted the enemy to the fact
that they were still alive. At the same time Fapla opened up with long range
artillery on us and we discovered that most of the places where we were
deploying turned out to be registered targets, the area between the two koppies
was totally unsuitable for vehicles and Capt. Holm really had no choice here.
The road North of Ebo was turned into a shooting gallery, the South Africans and
their allies bei
ng
the targets, later on some would recall how panic stricken members of the
infantry were scurrying around looking for cover, and the pathetic sight of some
of them looking for shelter on the road that was utterly devoid of any cover
whatsoever.Back at the approaches to the bridge Cpl Gert Botha managed to fire
one shot with his main armament before the third Eland was knocked out. The
second Eland now cut off, was an easy target and suffered the same fate, the
crew baled out, and immediately got fired on by enemy soldiers in foxholes about
60 metres away, Lcpl Gibbon fired at them with his 9mm Star pistol and this
enabled them to reach a donga nearby and relative safety, they stayed put there
the whole day. In the rear Eland, the crew and Cpl Botha decided that they were
safer inside the knocked out Eland as the enemy probably thought they had been
killed, and a short while later the Eland of Staff Sergeant Van der Linden was
knocked out as well, all three these armoured cars were knocked out at
relatively close ranges by RPG 7's. In the hours following the crews of the
first eight Elands that had been boxed in became the prime targets of the
enemies artillery, rocket launchers, small arms and "Red Eyes", The
rest of the battle now revolved around saving them and their crews, there was no
talk of launching a counterattack against the enemy in his well prepared
positions.
Lt
Swanepoel and Cpl Adams immediately decided to go to the assistance of his
friend Johan Du Toit, at the road junction there were two huts, and an open
field about the size of a rugby pitch, the two Elands stopped on the left and
right hand sides of the road to see if they see the missing armoured cars, but
to no avail, the sounds of the battle was clearly audible but they could not
determine where this was taking place. They then saw a BM 21 positioned on a
slope on the other side of the Massaba River. Both opened fire with their 90-mm
cannon, but the enemy was a little bit faster and on target this day. Cpl Adams'
Eland was straddled by a salvo, One rocket actually went under the drivers
compartment and exploded there, the wet terrain this time saved their lives as
the rocket buried itself before detonating, the mud absorbing most of the blast,
but the explosion was powerful enough to ensure that the driver injured his
knee, another exploded in front of the Eland, Cpl Adams wanted to withdraw but
the driver could not operate the vehicle due to his injury. The third a missile
hit the Eland on the drivers' hatch and the fourth exploded on the turret. The
interior of the Eland filled with smoke and the crew decided to bale out and
gapped it in the direction of Ebo, the driver only remembering that he had a
injured knee a sometime later.
Lt
Swanepoel in the meantime realised that on his own and out of 90mm rounds there
was nothing he could do to help his friends at the bridge, and decided to go and
help the crews of the two Elands that had bogged down earlier on. They had been
receiving small arms fire sporadically from the enemy trenches, and as soon as
he left the road he bogged down as well, he and his crew grabbed their tools but
by now the enemy had spotted them outside the Eland and started using them for
target practice, there was no way they were going to get these vehicles out
without some outside help, and that possibility was getting slimmer with each
passing second.
He
ordered the crews to abandon the three Elands and to gap it back to our own
lines, as a precaution he ordered them to split up. His decision was to gap it
back to the two koppies, the rationale being that our mortars would be somewhere
in the vicinity behind them. They were just about move through the gap in the
Koppies when the enemy decided to start hitting the koppies with 122mm rockets,
"Om keer!"
To
the left of these koppies there was a wooded area and him and another decided to
take this route, The only weapons they had was his 9mm pistol and a his
companions R1, on the way there they passed a kraal and one of the occupants
started shouting at them, (Most likely he was telling them that "No thanks,
we don't need any new double glazing, vacuum cleaners, and you certainly don't
look like insurance salesmen to me!"), they just eyed him, and kept on
running, and only stopped way past Ebo, and in hindsight this was a good
decision , the air was literally black with "Red Eyes" over our mortar
positions.
While
all this was happening, an Eland drove to the shot out Eland of Cpl Botha, and
in process suffered a hit on the muzzle brake of its 90-mm gun, rendering it
useless, but notwithstanding this Cpl Botha was brought to safety, by this time
the Eland squadron that had been held in reserve moved forward and one of them
managed to silence the 75-mm recoilless rifle that initiated the battle, to
great relief of the other two members of Cpl. Botha's crew who were brought to
safety after this. By this time the South Africans artillery had been deployed
at a old runway just North of Ebo, and soon opened up counter battery fire,
which although impressive to the observer on the ground proved to be relatively
ineffective due to the fact that they were not getting proper grid references
from the Cessna at first, and when these were getting through eventually, nobody
would believe the pilot. What the enemy had done was to turn conventional
artillery doctrine on its head, instead of having their guns far to the rear of
the infantry positions they had sited these as close as 2500 metres from their
front line, all our shells fell way behind them. We learnt a valuable lesson
from them this day; the same tactic was applied by us in Operation Modular and
Hooper with great success.
We
still couldn't use our mortars as we were out of range, and these were
eventually brought forward to a crest east of the two koppies Lt Swanepoel had
chosen as his objective when they abandoned the bogged down Elands. The 107-mm
mortars were situated about 60 - 70 yards in front of our 81-mm mortars and we
were busy setting up our mortars, getting ready to shoot the base plates in when
a couple 122-mm rockets which we presumed came from a Grad-P fell in the
vicinity, nobody was overly exited about this as nobody really rated FAPLA's
accuracy when using these. (At the time we were unaware of the fate that had
befallen the Elands, and that whoever was doing the shooting on the other side
knew their business). Well the same fella must have been fairly busy that day, a
salvo from a BM 21 (surprise! the 122-mm rockets earlier had not been from a
Grad-P as we had thought) revved both mortar positions leaving a number of dead
and wounded amongst them Staff Benson and 14 Unita 107-mm mortarists KIA, Staff
Steenkamp, Sgt Da Costa and scores others seriously wounded, most of these were
brought to rear by Capt. Holm and Venter. Sgt Sierro who was in charge of the
FNLA contingent was powerless to stop them from becoming a panic-stricken mob
under this bombardment, and 20 plus of them died because they were running
around aimlessly trying to seek shelter, and thus became easy targets. To top it
all they came under fire from RPG7s from the one koppie as they withdrew, it
really wasn't the nicest 2 hours that they spent on a road in Angola.
In
all this excitement Sgt Da Costa had been left behind, and as he had suffered
serious injuries to his leg, he had to crawl the two klicks back to safety.
The
mortars were now without an infantry screen and to cap it all most of the Unita
members were gone, Lt Van Niekerk "volunteered " all the survivors and
turned them into surprising good mortarists in one lesson that lasted all of
about 20 minutes. Foxbat had a First-Aid post at the Tunga River Bridge and the
wounded were stabilised there first before they were taken to Cela where proper
facilities existed for SADF surgeons to perform operations.
This
day was turning out to be a real ball breaker....
Lt
van Niekerk decided to try again to reach the stranded Elands this time with a
group of infantry and on the way there met W O Burger who had decided to
withdraw from the mortar position after being bracketed by 122-mm missiles.
Early
on in the fight Capt. Holm had changed vehicles, Capt. Holm driving an Eland,
and Lt van Niekerk the blue Honda, in which he had done sterling work this day,
this car had served as ambulance bringing wounded to the rear, ammunition to the
front, and as a reconnaissance vehicle. Another misfortune struck the Unita
contingent, their truck carrying the food and ammunition and personal belongings
had bogged down and had to be destroyed in situ to prevent the enemy capturing
it.
Once
Lt van Niekerk reached the mortar positions he found two South African soldiers
loading the abandoned mortars and ammunition on to two trucks, a little while
later Capt. Holm arrived and was standing in the turret talking to the group
when a single 122-mm rocket exploded close to them...
Death had repaid the insult from Capt. Holm at the "Y" with interest, Cpl Taljaard and Capt. Holm were killed, and Lt van Niekerk and the other soldier were wounded, notwithstanding this all the equipment was loaded on the truck, finally Cpl Taljaard's body was wrapped in a poncho by Lt Van Niekerk and put on the truck. It is not known how Capt. Holms' body was brought back. The blue Honda was peppered with shrapnel, the tires punctured, and the windows broken, they managed to get it going, but a short while down the road it finally broke down, and was abandoned. The order was finally given to the reserve force to recover the stranded Elands, at about 16H00; those that could not be recovered had to be destroyed.
This
was indeed a black day for us.
That
evening we discovered that all Elands had been accounted for except two and
their crews, and Lt Williamson flew looking for these until the lack of
visibility forced him to return to Cela. The cost to the South Africans was
heavy indeed, 4 dead, numerous wounded. The biggest loss was that of Capt. Johan
Holm, if any man can claim that he is "A man amongst men" he could,
everybody who ever served with him, and note I use the word "with" and
not "under" had the greatest respect for him, even though he was a
hard taskmaster sometimes, he always made you feel a part of the team and a
valued member at that .The enemy had captured 2 Elands, but most of all they had
proved to themselves that we were not invincible, and could be stopped. Unita
and the FNLA had probably lost about 50 dead, with as many wounded.
Casualties
on the enemy side was very hard to establish, the figures for Fapla are
unavailable, on the Cuban side they were 27 dead and 11 wounded, this
information came from Cuban POW's, how reliable this is I do not know.
The
fire discipline of the Cuban Forces facing us was admirable and earned the
grudging respect of the South Africans.
The
causes of this defeat:
1.
Lack of trained infantry, (Unita and the FNLA) the Elands had to make up for
this deficit more often than not, the ambush would have posed no problem to
well-trained infantry
2.
The terrain was totally unsuited for Elands, who were forced to operate mainly
on the road
3.
Complacency on our side, we had won every time, and this was going to be no
exception.
The
missing crewmembers were reunited with us on the Monday, after some hairy
adventures to say the least, but that's a story in itself.
This
defeat blocked our advance so it was back to Bridge 14 on the Nhia, but we would
be a little more streetwise this time.
POSTSCRIPT
On
the Tuesday 25th November 1975, Lt Williamson took off from Cela to do a recce
over the Massaba River, he did not return…….
THE AFTERMATH
We
had learnt a bitter lesson, and so did the enemy, 200 Cuban and other
reinforcements were rushed north to Conde under the command of Comandante Afredo,
a new OC Comandante Samwell was appointed, in Luanda and Havana alarm bells were
ringing, the Boere had been checked, but not defeated. From as far away as
Gabela and Luanda reinforcements were on their way, an additional BM-21 and 20
armoured cars were deployed to stop the South Africans. With this force they
outnumbered the South Africans, but they had not reckoned with Colonel Blackie
Swart, a man of few words, anybody who had served under him would testify that
like Patton, his subordinates would fear his wrath more than they would fear the
enemy.
Just sout
h of Santa Comba at a place called Cela the Catholic Church had established a
monastery in the early part of the 20th Century, in time a 
small
Aldeamento came to exist here and in the 1950's a runway was built by the
Portuguese. When the madness of the Angolan Civil war reached this haven of
civilisation the priests, nuns and most of the inhabitants decided to leave, and
moved to Santa Comba, which boasted a service station and a bakery. On 19
November 1975 we arrived at Cela, by this time the warring parties had looted
everything of value, Unita had taken over the airport buildings and one room had
been turned into a toilet, by the simple expedient of placing brick's randomly
so that one would not set in the excrement dotted all over the floor. When
nature called a Unita soldier would gingerly step from brick to brick until he
found a suitable spot, drop his trousers and add to the ever-growing pile of
human waste.
Next door to this was the local Unita contingent's field kitchen, which consisted of open fires inside the room. For reasons unknown they had given the Monastery a miss after looting it and it was here that Brigadier Dawie Schoeman decided to establish his Brigade HQ. Here one would find the usual mix of cooks, tiffies, medical orderlies, surgical team, chaplain, staff officers who would co-ordinate the activities of the various combat teams, a fly spy, signallers etc. all of these were flown in by plane. Their first job was to thoroughly clean the monastery, as it was absolutely filthy. Colonel Dippenaar was in charge of the Surgical team and when he saw what his "Hospital" looked like he could just shake his head but he and his 12 men immediately got cracking and within days the toilets had been unblocked, they had found a cement mixer from somewhere and hooked this up to a Unimog and used this as a washing machine. A lot of South African troops in Angola utilised cement mixers as washing machines and on several occasions front end loaders were used to dig trenches and field toilets. A petrol generator was acquired from somewhere as well as a couple of kerosene refrigerators and deep freezers as we did not have any kerosene these were run on diesel and did so without any problems.
RSM
Slade was in charge of the Wards and the poor man was driven to the edge of
insanity by Unita patients who had a habit of getting out of bed
at night defecating next to their bed and getting back in and going back to
sleep. The first patient who was treated was a Unita soldier who had lost his
leg when he tripped a Pom-Z anti-personnel mine. Days after Colonel Dippenaar
pronounced the hospital fully operational the first wounded arrived from the
battle at Ebo. The medical team spent the whole night attending to the 12
wounded. As there was no plasma available Doctors and Medical orderlies gave
blood between attending patients, without their selfless devotion many of the
wounded would not have survived.
At
his HQ at Tunga Cmdt Kruys held an order group the night after the battle for
Ebo , it was a miserable affair , Kruys took the debacle at Ebo hard, that night
we retreated heads down, "What had gone wrong ? surely we were fighting the
good fight ?" We had been knocking at the Enemies door, Yes, we had lost
equipment and men, but the enemy had lost more. It would seem that even the
elements were sharing our sorrow, a miserable rain started falling, and before
long the troops in the field were soaked to the bone and tossing fitfully in
their sleeping bags. Those who were standing guard , hunched their shoulders
against the wind and rain, and prayed for their relief to arrive.... A mournful
end to a mournful day .
Colonel
Blackie Swart was tasked to take overall command and a few days later his
position as Commanding Officer of Combat Group Zulu was confirmed , a fresh new
wind was blowing and even amongst the troops on the ground the feeling was that
this was the man who would cut the Cubans down to size.The bulk of Zulu
consisted of Bravo Group under the command of Cmdt Jan Breytenbach,to assist him
he had the Major Frank Bestbier and Lieutenant Cornè Van Wyk, two names that
would become synonymous with our Bush war. Foxbat commanded by Cmdt Kruys, was
switched to Task Force Zulu, as a result of the fact that Alpha had stayed
behind at Novo Redondo. Cmdt Joffel van der Westhuizen arrived with
reinforcements in the shape of additional G2 artillery, and most of the Eland
crews were rotated back.
Bravo was positioned to the south of the saddle on the road to Quibala and Alpha took up positions on the Western flank in anticipation of a renewed attack aimed initially at Ebo, should this succeed the door to Quibala would be unlocked. Major Luther de Bruyn together with a force of 300 men arrived at Quissobi, where Cmdt Kruys found them. These were the first sizeable contingent of South African soldiers to operate as a unit in Operation Savannah, and they were immediately utilised to defend the South African HQ and arms dumps in the event of a surprise Cuban counter attack. Wherever one finds a a sizeable military unit one will find a Sergeant-major and this proved to be the case here as well, Sergeant Major China Van der Walt appeared out of the blue, and quickly made sure that the troops received whatever creature comforts he could lay his hands on, like a magician he conjured up a weekly ration of 2 packets of cigarettes , mostly captured Cuban Populares although the odd packet of Texan and Gunston also made their appearance, in addition to this each man received a can of cold drink, and a can of beer per week. A popular way of chilling these was to hold a can in front of the valve of a bottle of LPG, and opening the tap, but after a couple of troops were spotted doing this the word came down that anybody caught doing this would be court-martialed, and although the practice never ceased this method fell into disuse. Cigarettes quickly became a currency in barter trade between the South Africans and Unita; the going rate for a Unita uniform was 2 packs of cigarettes. Once one had the uniform it would be submerged into a container of petrol to kill off any guests its previous owner might or might not have had, and then hung out to dry, One had to pretty vigilant at this point ,as the former owners sometimes would try and reclaim their uniforms, once dry the uniform would be washed in a cement mixer , which by now had become an integral part of most units.
At
Quissobi Major Slabbert was waiting for his replacement, and to pass the time he
spent hours discussing tactics with the two "Gunners", Captain Bouwer
and Major Venter. These two officers had taken the lessons learnt at Ebo to
heart , especially the fact that the Cuban BM21 MLR's could outrange the 8.8cm
(G1) and 14cm (G2) field guns in the South African armoury. The BM21 had a range
of 20,000 metres, whereas the 8.8cm o
nly
had a range of 12,250 metres, and the
14cm or " Vyf Vyf " as it was called could only
reach 16,400 metres. The upshot of these discussions were that the South
Africans would stand conventional artillery doctrine on its head, instead of
placing the guns well into the rear, from now on the guns would be placed just
behind the front lines, and if necessary in front of the troops, this radical
change would be fraught with danger, as a sudden counter-attack would mean that
the guns would be overrun but the plus factor would be that the enemy would not
expect this, and it was decided that a light screening of infantry would
suffice as a protective element. One thing the we had in our favour was that we
were a conscript army, and the gunners had done 3 months basic infantry
training, so in the event of an attack they would probably give as good, if not
better than they got.
Cmdt
Kruys decided that as FAPLA had blown the bridge over the Tunga it would be a
waste of time to use this route again , and they would be sure to expect us to
attack using the same road we had used before, Colonel Swart concurred and it
was decided that a reconnaissance would be mounted to ascertain if the route via
Hengo towards Condè was viable, the team reported that FAPLA was busy
rebuilding the bridge they had destroyed earlier, and on 27 November 1975, a
Combat Team from Foxbat attacked FAPLA whilst they were repairing the bridge,
and after a short but bloody fight, Fapla decided to retreat, without destroying
their handiwork. The FNLA soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Van Wyk, whom Cmdt
Kruys described as " The best damned infantry I ever had, even though they
were already burnt out" established a bridgehead on the far bank and dug in
waiting for the inevitable counter-attack. The sappers immediately started where
FAPLA left off .
It
is said that that God looks after drunks, dumb animals and little children, well
this day He also held us in His hand, Lieutenant Van Wyk and his troops had
driven straight through a minefield without realising it, this only came to
light when Colonel Swart and the senior officers of the South African Forces
came to rubberneck at the construction work , Cmdt
Swart noticed some disturbed ground, and as he glanced around him the telltale
checker board pattern of a minefield became apparent, the former OC of Task
Force Zulu's Eland squadron Major Slabbert started probing one of these patches
carefully, and soon unearthed a Soviet TM-62M anti-tank mine , to cap matters
the 2IC of Cmdt Kruys' battle group Kmdt Hans Möller had just arrived and was
about to walk up to to him, a shouted warning to him stopped him and his group
in their tracks. To the amusement of all concerned Cmdt Kruys and his party gingerly
picked their way of the minefield, one person who shall remain nameless later
recounted "They reminded me of a priest leaving a brothel at 02H00 ! "
About 15 minutes later a Sapper one Pipper decided to blow a mine in situ, much
to the chagrin of the senior officers who had not yet regained their composure
nor dignity, the load of abuse and threats that descended on this poor mans head
was out of this world.
Captain
Chris Bouwer decided to establish an observation post on a Koppie , together
with a small detachment of Parabats he climbed this , but no sooner had he
established Comms, the heavens opened and he hastily decided to seek shelter in
a opening between two stone outcroppings on the summit, about 4 metres from
his radio as there was a lot of lightning strikes, he had
just congratulated himself for being prudent when a bolt of
lightning shattered a rock about a meter from his position, he realised that
although the rocks above him gave shelter from the elements, being so close to
the actual summit was foolish and he beat a hasty retreat towards the base,
whilst he was engaged in this, a lightning strike knocked one of the Parabats
of his perch on a rock where he had foolishly decided to wait out the storm,
the unfortunate "troep" fell about 3 metres, but luckily apart from a
few bruises he suffered no injury. The same storm brought all the repair work
at the bridge to a standstill. As the rain slackened Captain Bouwer noticed a
vehicle arriving at the adjoining village Balabaia, he was sure that this
vehicle belonged to the enemy, but he could not make out what they were up to,
finally the rain stopped and he could see that they were laying a minefield in
the road leading to the village. he immediately requested a fire mission, and
as soon as the first shell exploded some 80 metres from the enemy they dropped
everything and piled into their truck and sped off. Captain Bouwer relayed
adjustments to the ranging shot and then requested a the battery to fire for
effect, a salvo quickly followed and one shell landed pretty close to the
speeding truck, The South Africans had the satisfaction of seeing two of the
occupants falling off the back, the truck careered drunkenly into some trees,
and was not seen again. The two enemy bodies laid where they had fallen, and we
assumed that they had either been killed by the artillery strike, or as a result of
the fall from the truck. That night 4 Field Squadron worked non-stop without a
break, and by first light, Friday 28 November 1975, 2nd Lieutenant Ted Fountain
could report that the bridge over the Hengo river had been completed as
promised.
Combat
Group Foxbat had a torrid time in the storm that day, the roads in this part of
Angola consisted of dirt tracks and the extensive road building programme that
Portugal had embarked on in Angola had not reached here, it was not an uncommon
sight to see a road wash away in front of us on several occasions, and after a
long struggle Foxbat reached a deserted Coffee plantation in the vicinity of the
"Y". During the colonial times the owner had fenced the building
complex with a high security fence, everybody was rather pleased at the prospect
of a dry night, and when the decision was made to bivouac there the members of
Foxbat could not believe their luck as the farmhouse and outbuildings were
almost unscathed, and it was not long before everybody had found themselves a
comfortable nesting place for the evening. This happy state did not last long,
as soon as Cmdt Kruys arrived he decided that the enemy would be aware of a
feature like this, and would most likely have it preregistered as a target, and
without futher ado informed everybody that their elation was premature, Foxbat
would not be spending the evening there, and in the pouring rain Foxbat had to
vacate their quarters and eventually established a temporary base in the bush,
about 700 metres from the building complex. There was a great deal of
unhappiness about this decision and dark threats were muttered about what would
happen to Cmdt Kruys should he be so foolish as to venture in the dark on his
own. The lucky ones wangled a position inside the trucks that evening, but the
most of us spent another miserable night trying to sleep in 6 to 8 centimeters
of mud and water, to make ourselves feel better a lot of mutterings were uttered
about "slapgatte" and "softies" that could not stand a
little bit of hardship, and sleep in the rain, and dire prophesies were made
that if we were attacked, those inside the trucks would be sitting targets, and
we would be unscathed, but to be honest, most of us wished we were warm and dry,
instead of being cold and wet. To add to our misery there was a battery of 8.8cm
G1 guns not far from our position, and later on that night they fired on a
target of opportunity, most of us almost had a heart attack until we realised
that it was our guns.
About
04H00 most of us who had tried unsuccessfully to sleep out in the open decided
that we might as well get up, and slowly one could start to discern shapes in
the gray early morning haze, the occasional flare of a match being cupped as one
lit up a Texan or Venus, the coughing and hawking as we got ready for another
day, the checking of ones personal weapon, putting the safety catch on , and the
million and one things a soldier does and has done since men have gone to war.
As soon as it became light enough to see, dead wood was collected and petrol or
diesel splashed over it and a fire lit, a pack of ""Koffiehuis"
coffee which had by some mysterious way had found its way from the kitchen to
ones kit would appear and the fragrant smell of coffee filled the air.Here and
there a "troep" would be hunkered next to shovel frying an egg and
"ovambopiele", others would be munching dogbiscuits,a sight that would
imprint itself on the souls of two generations of South African Soldiers during
our lifetime.
Breakfast was still in progress when the first salvo of 122mm BM21 rockets came screaming over, and bracketed the farmhouse we had vacated the previous evening, the bombardment kept up for about 45 minutes and after it stopped the farmhouse and outbuildings were just a pile of rubble, Cmdt Kruys's premonition had been correct, if we had stayed there, Foxbat would have been wiped out. A lot of people looked at him with different perspectives after this event
GLOSSARY
Rev
: Rhodesian slang, to fire at somebody e.g. we revved them
Koppie:
(Lit. Cup) Afrikaans for small hill, shaped like a cup that's been placed upside
down
Gap:
Rhodesian slang, to run away e.g. we gapped it
Klick:
Kilometre
Om keer!
: Afrikaans term for the order "About Face!"
Eland:
French Panhard Armoured Car made under license in South Africa. Armament 1 x
90-mm low-pressure gun, 1 x 7,62-mm Browning 60-mm breech loading mortar, 1 x 7,
62-mm Browning Mg
Grad-P:
122-mm Free flight Soviet rocket, with HE warhead has a very simplified
launcher, the Missile can be fired from any improvised launcher, but this
effects the accuracy
RPG7:
85-mm Soviet rocket propelled grenade, the direct descendant of the WW II German
Panzerfaust 150, can defeat more than 20 cm of armour, a very versatile weapon
AK47:
Abbreviation for Avtomat Kalashnikov, the standard Soviet rifle, fires 7,62 x
39-mm intermediate cartridge, America's gift to the world was Coca-Cola;
Russia's was the AK47
BM-21:
Soviet 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher mounted on Ural Truck
Red Eye: Translation of Afrikaans name "Rooi Oog" for 122-mm rockets due to their signature whilst in flight
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Cobus Venter 2006